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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1837
___________
VON H. ARGYLE,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court
(Tax Court No. 08-6820)
Tax Court Judge: Honorable Mary Ann Cohen
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 14, 2010
Before: SMITH, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 14, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Von Argyle, proceeding pro se, appeals a decision of the United States Tax Court
finding him liable for deficiencies and penalties in connection with his federal income tax
returns. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.

In March 2008, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued Argyle, a certified
public accountant, a notice of deficiency for tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006. The IRS
asserted deficiencies of $7,478, $3,606, and $10,607, respectively, plus a penalty under
26 U.S.C. § 6662(a) for each year. Argyle filed a petition in Tax Court contesting the
notice of deficiency. Argyle and the IRS entered into a stipulation as to some of the
relevant facts and the case proceeded to a bench trial as to various tax issues. The Tax
Court issued a decision in September 2009, concluding that Argyle had not carried his
burden of proof as to the factual issues. Argyle filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied. The Tax Court issued a final decision incorporating the IRS’ post-trial
computation of deficiencies in the amounts of $2,180, $1,384 and $10,154 for the
respective tax years, plus penalties. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a). We exercise plenary review
over the Tax Court’s conclusions of law and review its factual findings for clear error.
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 212 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000).1
Argyle contests the Tax Court’s decision that he was not entitled to single filing
status. The parties stipulated that Argyle is married, that his wife filed for divorce in
August 2004 but a divorce was not granted during the years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and
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The Commissioner argues that we should dismiss Argyle’s appeal due to his filing of
an inadequate brief. Although Argyle relies on his Tax Court brief in arguing for reversal
of several of the Tax Court’s rulings, we decline to dismiss his appeal in light of his pro
se status.
2

that Argyle and his wife lived separate and apart during these years. The Tax Court
explained that, subject to certain exceptions that did not apply, the relevant statute
provides that “an individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce
or of separate maintenance shall not be considered as married.” 26 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(2).
Because Argyle was neither divorced nor a party to a decree of separate maintenance, the
Tax Court concluded that he was not entitled to single filing status. The Tax Court
rejected Argyle’s contention that his “separate and apart” living status conferred single
filing status. We agree. The Tax Court did not err in ruling that Argyle was not entitled
to single filing status.
Argyle also challenges the Tax Court’s ruling that he was not permitted to deduct
his legal expenses related to criminal proceedings for simple assault. The record reflects
that in 2004 Argyle provided accounting and tax preparation services for a client in
Pennsylvania. A woman who worked for the client filed a criminal complaint against
Argyle after he kissed her at his home and he pleaded no contest to a simple assault
charge. Argyle was represented by Paul Gettleman during the criminal proceedings. The
parties stipulated that Argyle paid Gettleman $12,500 during 2004, $25,000 in 2005, and
$25,000 in 2006. Argyle also paid $645 to Gettleman’s investigator. Argyle deducted
these fees as “legal and professional services” on his tax returns. Argyle also deducted an
additional $10,000 in legal fees that he claims he paid Gettleman in 2005.
Argyle maintained that the woman filed her complaint because he had reprimanded
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her for misconduct in his client’s business and that his legal fees were thus deductible
under United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963), which held that the test for
deductibility is the origin and character of the legal claim for which the expense was
incurred. The Tax Court concluded that Argyle failed to corroborate his claim that the
employee engaged in misconduct, noting that he did not call Gettleman to testify, and that
the preponderance of the evidence established that the legal fees arose out of a personal
relationship and were not deductible business expenses. The record supports these
conclusions. Argyle testified that he had met the woman for two meals, that she had used
his car, that he had kissed her at his home, and that she had kissed him.
Argyle also challenges the Tax Court’s conclusion that he took other improper
business expense deductions. The record reflects that prior to September 1, 2004, Argyle
used residential property in Pennsylvania as his office. After September 1, 2004, he used
the same property as his residence. As noted by the Tax Court, Argyle conceded at trial
that part of his deduction for mortgage interest on the property had been recorded as an
itemized deduction on Schedule A and also as a business expense on Schedule C. The
Tax Court also found that Argyle did not properly allocate his expenses that related to the
use of his home as an office and as a residence. The Tax Court noted that the IRS
conceded a portion of the claimed home office expense and that Argyle did not show that
he was entitled to a greater amount. The Tax Court also concluded that Argyle did not
properly calculate his vehicle expenses or substantiate his travel and meal expenses.
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Noting that Argyle testified that he did not know whether he reduced the cost of business
meals by fifty percent as required by statute and that some of the amounts claimed were
estimates, the Tax Court found his assertions as to deductibility unreliable. Argyle has
not shown that the Tax Court erred as to any of these findings.2
Finally, Argyle contends in his brief that his due process rights were violated based
upon inadequate information provided by the IRS in its notice of deficiency. Argyle,
however, was afforded a trial to contest the notice of deficiency. He has not shown a
violation of his due process rights.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax Court.
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Argyle states in his brief that the Tax Court should be reversed as to denied legal
expenses, business expenses, and filing status. Appellant’s Br. at 4. We have thus not
considered the Tax Court’s additional rulings regarding his early withdrawals from his
individual retirement account or the penalties imposed pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6662(a).
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